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INTRODUCTION
Espionage is curiously ill-defined under international law, even
though all developed nations, as well as many lesser-developed ones,
conduct spying and eavesdropping operations against their
neighbors.' Examined in light of the realist approach to international
relations, states spy on one another according to their relative power
positions in order to achieve self-interested goals. This theoretical
. J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2004; B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1994. The author
thanks Professor Richard Steinberg for his invaluable guidance throughout the
theoretical development of this essay, and Robert Deitz for his insightful
comments on an early draft. Most especially, the author thanks his wife for her
unwavering "tolerance" of him during the many months devoted to this project.
1. See discussion infra Part I (noting the tension between the national security
benefits that derive from espionage, and the normative and legal dilemmas related
to its practice).
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approach, however, not only fails to explain international tolerance
for espionage, but also inadequately captures the cooperative benefits
that accrue to all international states as a result of espionage.
In contrast to realism, the functional theory of international
relations comprehensively explains the benefits Of global espionage.
According to the functionalist approach, states cooperate
internationally to effectively fulfill individual domestic obligations.
By minimizing friction with their neighbors, states can direct more
resources to maximizing national welfare. Also, international
cooperation enhances domestic welfare by yielding conditions and
opportunities that benefit trade, the environment, and other
functional areas that could not be accomplished by states acting
individually.
The functional approach to international relations predicts that
states achieve peaceful coexistence through cooperation.2
Essentially, adherents to this perspective argue that the first step
towards global peace is to facilitate international cooperation within
discrete, functional activities. In the context of national security
policy, functionalists predict that international cooperation
throughout state security activities will foster peaceful relations.3
This essay argues that international law neither endorses nor
prohibits espionage, but rather preserves the practice as a tool by
which to facilitate international cooperation. Espionage functionally
permits states not only to verify that their neighbors are complying
with international obligations, but also to confirm the legitimacy of
those assurances that their neighbors provide. States are more willing
to cooperate across various functional lines because espionage is
available as a tool by which to monitor foreign behavior.4
Part I of this essay briefly explores the legal status of espionage
and addresses the unresolved debate among international legal
2. See discussion infra Part IL.A (discussing the evolution of functionalism
and its predictive value in defining the role of espionage in international relations).
3. See id. (noting the functional view that peaceful international relationships
rely on the cooperation that results from activities such as organized and
authorized espionage).
4. See discussion infra Part I (defining espionage generally and the role it
plays in fostering international cooperation).
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scholars regarding espionage's legitimacy under positive law.' Part II
argues that espionage's legitimacy is measured most appropriately
against the functionalist theory of international relations. After
outlining the theory, this essay adopts the functional approach to
examining international cooperation within national security
frameworks.6 In Part III, this essay proposes that spying
complements the monitoring and verification regimes positively
recognized within many international treaties to better enable
functional cooperation. Distinguishable from conventional
verification measures, espionage serves as an extension of
monitoring regimes, and thereby enables functional cooperation.7
This essay concludes that the continued functional relevance of
espionage is rooted in the growth of modem, transnational threats
that increasingly threaten international security.8
I. ESPIONAGE - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
AND LEGAL STATUS
Though subject to various technical definitions, "espionage" can
be considered a "consciously deceitful collection of information,
ordered by a government... accomplished by humans unauthorized
by the target to do the collection."9 This narrow definition
conspicuously removes certain electronic surveillance methods,
referred to as "national technical means," from the scope of
espionage.10 Even though satellite and aerial reconnaissance
5. See discussion infra Part I (stating that positive international law does not
specifically endorse espionage as a national defense tool).
6. See discussion infra Part II (outlining the functionalist view of espionage's
contribution to international cooperation and to the enhancement of national
security monitoring regimes).
7. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that espionage enables parties to a
treaty to monitor each other's compliance).
8. See discussion infra Conclusion (concluding that espionage is a necessary
tool in the modern era of increased threats to national security).
9. See Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 325-26 (1996) (defining generally the meaning of
espionage and stating that analysis, planning, and processing of information does
not fit withiji the definition).
10. See Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26
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implicate normative and legal issues similar to those implicated by
human espionage, electronic spying is rarely as territorially-intrusive.
Indeed, several international arms control agreements positively
authorize states to monitor other parties' compliance using available
technical means.11 None of these treaties, however, specifically
legitimizes espionage.
National leaders use the information they gain through espionage
to make better-informed policy decisions. 2 Though espionage has a
rich history, its status under international law is curiously ill-
defined. 3  Although no international agreement affirmatively
endorses espionage, states do not reject it as a violation of
international law.'4 As a result of its historical acceptance,
espionage's legal validity may be grounded in the recognition that
"custom" serves as an authoritative source of international law. 15
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 33 (1993) (stating that most international arms control
agreements explicitly authorize the use of technical monitoring devices).
11. See id. (explaining that, prior to signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the
late 1980s, the Soviet Union considered aerial reconnaissance a form of
espionage).
12. See Demarest, supra note 9, at 322-23 (defining espionage as knowledge
that states collect to aid in the conduct of their foreign relations, and stating that it
involves cycles of steps, including the collection and dissemination of specific
kinds of information).
13. See Richard A. Falk, Forward, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962) (citing the Egyptian secret
service's commission of international espionage over 5,000 years ago as an early
act of spying); see also Loch K. Johnson, Spies, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 2000, at 18
("[S]pies... have been around in one form or another since the Lord told Moses to
'send men to spy out the land of Canaan."'); Demarest, supra note 9, at 321
("[I]ntemational law regarding peacetime espionage is virtually unstated .... ").
14. Compare Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention
in Internal Affairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 13, at 1, 12 (contending that peacetime espionage violates international laws
that protect state territorial integrity and political independence), with Julius Stone,
Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, in ESSAYS ON
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 29, 36 (suggesting that, in
light of space exploration and reconnaissance, "territorial sovereignty in the old
sense of full psychological sacrosanctity is no longer with us").
15. See, e.g., Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law:
An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 194 (1984)
(noting that the Statute of the International Court of Justice codifies the four
sources of international law: "international convention, international custom,
'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,' and writings of court
1094 [19:1091
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According to this argument, international espionage is legal because
states have spied and eavesdropped on each other throughout
history.
6
The lack of consensus regarding the legal status of international
espionage should give national leaders cause for concern. '7 In light
of such uncertainty, states can expect one another to use any legally-
available tool if, by doing so, they will improve their national
welfare. 8 Nonetheless, the inadequacy of positive law regarding
espionage cannot explain its widespread, international tolerance.
Espionage may derive normative legitimacy as an extension of the
state's well-recognized right to self-defense. Some international legal
scholars conceptualize self-defense as a "broad" right that permits
preemptive strikes in limited circumstances in order to protect
national security. 19 Under this broad view, espionage is considered a
necessary and legal technique by which to guard a nation's borders.2 °
and scholars").
16. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 14, at 16-17 (noting the work of Lassa
Oppenheim, the well-known British jurist, who wrote that espionage is not
politically or legally wrong and that there is a general practice of espionage by all
states). But cf id. at 16 (suggesting that a frequently-practiced behavior that is
accompanied by a "sense of wrong" does not establish a rule of law).
17. See Stone, supra note 14, at 34 ("[A]s the law now stands, there is no
sufficient warrant for saying that international law does not permit state-authorized
espionage in peacetime."); see also Richard A. Falk, Space Espionage and World
Order: A Consideration of the Samos-Midas Program, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 45, 57, 79 n.28 (noting that ample
"authoritative doctrine" supports the contention that espionage does not violate
international law); Demarest, supra note 9, at 331 ("[T]here is no consensus that
espionage is a crime outside of a municipal statutory sense.").
18. See Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive Information
Operations in Space, 9 U.S. AFA J. LEG. STUD. 121, 140 (1999) ("[T]he lack of an
international prohibition of espionage leaves decision makers with the usually
acceptable liability of merely violating the target nation's domestic espionage
law."), http://www.usafa.af.mil/dfl/documents/wingfield.doc (last visited April 6,
2004).
19. See Polebaum, supra note 15, at 207.
20. See Wright, supra note 14, at 17-18 (noting that in 1960, after a U.S. U-2
plane was shot down over the Soviet Union, the Secretary of State defended the act
of espionage, stating that "[T]he Government of the United States would be
derelict to its responsibility, not only to the American people, but to free peoples
everywhere if it did not... take such measures as are possible unilaterally to
lessen and to overcome [the] danger of surprise attack.").
2004] 1095
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However, positive international law does not explicitly embrace such
an absolute, expansive interpretation of the right to self-defense.
Instead, international law, as codified in the United Nations Charter,
preserves a state's "inherent right" to self-defense "if an armed attack
occurs against" that state.21
Even within this framework of positive international law,
espionage may be justified by corollary: in order to ensure that the
right to self-defense retains substantive meaning, international law
must permit states to predict armed attack. Therefore, for states to
enjoy the positively-codified right to self-defense, they should retain
the right to acquire information that would indicate whether they face
imminent armed attack.2
Similarly, the right to self-defense is hollow unless states are
permitted to prepare themselves to repel armed attack. To
accomplish this, states must have foreknowledge of the threat and its
capabilities. For example, the mere knowledge that a neighboring
state harbors hostile intentions does not sufficiently equip the
threatened state with the requisite knowledge with which to
adequately defend itself. Appreciating an unfriendly state's
immediate intentions, capabilities, and weaknesses is essential to
defending against attack.
In 1962, the United States conducted U-2 flights over Cuba after
eight CIA reports indicated that missile parts from Soviet ships were
being unloaded in Cuban ports. 23 Subsequent U-2 imagery confirmed
the building of missile sites on the island, but only after another CIA
informant within the Soviet military provided drawings of similar
sites inside Russia.24 At the height of the crisis, espionage provided
21. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (providing that a state may resort to self-defense
if confronted with an armed attack).
22. See Stone, supra note 14, at 42 ("[S]pying may serve the common-interest
function of warning the spying state of the other's preparations for surprise
attack.").
23. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 24-25 (highlighting the importance of the
information that CIA agents collected relating to the activities of the Soviet Union
in Cuba).
24. See id. at 24 (noting that people, in addition to technology, are important in
the collection of information). For example, CIA agents who provided detailed
information on Soviet military activities during the Cold War were invaluable to
the CIA. Id.
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sufficient forewarning of a potentially imminent threat, thereby
enabling the United States to defend itself.
Espionage accomplishes the prerequisites essential for states to
enjoy the internationally-recognized right to self-defense. For those
scholars who argue that espionage's legality derives from the right to
self-defense, the lawfulness of a particular act of spying may depend
on the sponsor state's motivation.25 If the information sought
"contributes to defensive rather than aggressive policies of national
defense," the act of espionage arguably would claim greater
legitimacy under international law.26
Given that most states outlaw domestic spying, positive
recognition of espionage under international law could threaten its
normative legitimacy.27 On the other hand, it would be similarly
troublesome to prohibit international espionage by treaty or
agreement in light of the self-defense functions that espionage
serves. The resulting normative dilemma leaves policymakers unable
either to recognize or to disavow the legality of spying. As developed
in Part III, this dilemma can best be framed by appreciating
espionage as a functional tool that enables international cooperation.
II. ESPIONAGE ENABLES FUNCTIONAL
SECURITY COOPERATION
A. THE EVOLUTION OF FUNCTIONALISM
Functionalism evolved after World War II as a theory by which to
describe and explain international cooperation. Prior competing
theories of international relations, such as structural realism and
rational institutionalism, explained cooperation as a phenomenon
inextricably linked to state-level power and interests.28 Several post-
25. See Falk, supra note 17, at 58 (suggesting that "the test for the relative
illegality of espionage rests to some degree upon one's judgment of the end being
sought.").
26. See id. (discussing how states' motivation factors into the legality of
government espionage).
27. See Demarest, supra note 9, at 330 ("[P]eacetime espionage has always
been seen as an issue of domestic law .... ).
28. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
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World War II dynamics combined to reveal the need to conceptualize
problem-solving at a global level (an approach not necessarily
compatible with power-centric models of international relations).
After World War II, an explosion of new states coincided with an
acceleration in scientific and technical innovation, giving rise to
challenges that required global solutions.29 Functionalism provided
the theoretical overlay by which to coordinate state cooperation in
solving such complex problems."
Functionalism predicts that states cooperate in order to maximize
national prosperity.31 State leaders recognize that in order to
discharge domestic obligations associated with providing for the
common welfare, they must cooperate with their neighbors.
Certainly, establishing cooperative and peaceful relationships with
neighbors enables state leaders to focus on achieving national goals
associated with social, political, and economic advancement. Once
international cooperation is secured, states are not burdened with the
friction of unstable foreign relations.
In addition, fostering international cooperation creates
opportunities and improves conditions beyond the level that states
Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 11 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983) ("[T]he prevailing explanation for the existence of international
regimes is egoistic self-interest."). Krasner defines egoistic self-interest as the
"desire to maximize one's own utility function where that function does not
include the utility of another party." Id.; see also ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 49,
50 (1984) (claiming that cooperation can emerge "when shared interests are
sufficiently important and other key conditions are met").
29. See David Mitrany, The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?,
in FUNCTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 53, 65
(AJR Groom & Paul Taylor eds., 1975) (noting that post-World War II inventions
and scientific discoveries raised political, social, and moral issues that transcended
any single state or continent).
30. See id. (proposing that functionalism provides the most coherent and
reasonable approach to many underlying issues and complex global problems).
31. See Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, Working for Peace: the
Functional Approach, Functionalism and Beyond, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONALISM 1, 6 (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long eds.,
1999) ("[I]n sum, the functional approach emphasized that cooperation across
national boundaries occurred because the maximization of social welfare, though a
goal of states, was not attainable within the boundaries of each national state
separately.").
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could achieve by acting individually. States cannot solve
transnational problems such as AIDS, pollution, terrorism, and the
drug trade without international cooperation.32 By elevating welfare
and global peace above nationalism and prestige, states strive to
create the peaceful preconditions that will allow them to achieve
their domestic mandates.33
Recognizing peace as an end in and of itself, functionalists
propose that cooperation within the practical domain of common
activities is the lynchpin to international relationships.34 This
functional approach is reflected in the evolution of international
agencies that predate the United Nations, in which international
issues were compartmentalized according to subject matter. States
could address issues that transcended national boundaries on a
multilateral level, where relevant state actors associated with the
particular functional area would convene to frame cooperative
solutions. As an example, the International Telegraphic Union and
the Universal Postal Union represent early attempts to channel
common issues pertaining to a discrete set of functional activities.35
Ernst Haas captured the spirit of functionalism in his description
of the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC").36 Haas and
other functionalists predicted that by joining their mutual coal and
32. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 12
(1999) (suggesting that technology creates new international issues that require
transnational solutions).
33. See Charles Pentland, Functionalism and Theories of International
Political Integration, in FUNCTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 9, 15 (explaining that the creation of
an interdependent society through the linking of social and economic issues erodes
potential sources of conflict).
34. E.g., Mitrany, supra note 29, at 65 (discussing how social, political and
technical phenomena challenge the limits of individual states and encourage
international cooperation).
35. See James Patrick Sewell, The United Nations and Functional Conflict
Management, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONALISM, supra
note 31, at 105, 107 (analyzing the United Nations' efforts toward "functional
selection and organization of international relations").
36. See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957, 283-317 (1958) (providing a detailed history of the
ideology and political expectations of the European integration of this economic
sector).
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steel interests, France and Germany could establish the preconditions
for a peaceful postwar coexistence.37 In linking closely-aligned
economic interests, resultant interactions between functionally-
related communities yielded greater security.38 According to this
functional approach, the building of common institutions would
inevitably create trust between France and Germany, and the
evolution of increasingly expansive partnerships would yield greater
cooperation and security.3 9 Haas' example of the ECSC. well
represents the foundational prediction of functionalism: actors
recognize that their individual ideological tenets are best achieved by
cooperating with other actors who share similar functional
characteristics.
B. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Functionalism's explanatory and predictive usefulness is not
limited to purely economic domains, but is rather an approach
readily-adaptable to the international security context. For example,
the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force ("RRF") contemplates
cooperation among several European states by melding discrete
national militaries pursuant to common security interests (namely,
defending against common threats).4" States achieve international
37. See David Long, The Security Discourses of the European Union: A
Functional Critique, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONALISM,
supra note 31, at 120, 130 (discussing the theory that reconstruction efforts based
on economic interests would be more valuable than diplomatic efforts within the
League of Nations). Haas' contribution to the development of functional theory
was his incorporation of the "spill-over" concept, which yielded a strain of
functionalism referred to as neofunctionalism. See Pentland, supra note 33, at 17-
18 (explaining that neofunctionalism embraced supranationalism to achieve
integration).
38. See Long, supra note 37, at 132 (highlighting the close link between
economic welfare and security).
39. See id. (noting that "[S]ecurity emerges from the overlapping network of
functional associations in a number of areas," most notably in social and economic
settings and not in those areas related to national security).
40. See Joel Blocker, Western Press Review: EU's Rapid Reaction Force and
Other Subjects (Radio Free Europe broadcast, Nov. 21, 2000) (explaining that the
RRF is tailored to respond to a host of different threats, including crisis
management, humanitarian relief and peace-keeping),
http://www.rferl.org/features/2000/10/20102000153143.asp (last visited Mar. 24,
2004).
1100 [19:1091
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ESPIONAGE
cooperation by linking common security interests along the lines of
related functional activities. The infrastructure designed to manage
the RRF represents a functional model for achieving multilateral
cooperation.
While realism has emerged as the dominant theoretical approach
to understanding international relationships,4" functionalism may
constructively challenge the realists' conception of cooperation.
Adopting a strictly realist perspective, Kenneth Abbott has
approached the subject of international cooperation in the context of
arms control treaties.42 Because competitive security frameworks are
unique in the world of international relations, Abbott explains that
cooperation depends on satisfying state-level information demands.43
The twin strategies of verification' and assurance 45 enable parties to
ensure that other states are not cheating their international
obligations.
Implying that espionage is simply one of many tools available for
verifying treaty compliance,46 Abbott erroneously conflates two
distinct operations. As previously explained, espionage activities are
fundamentally different from conventional monitoring techniques.47
Verification and assurance measures intended to monitor compliance
among treaty partners are positively recognized, defined, and
41. See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law,
and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361,
364 (1999) (explaining that realism is premised on the notion of states, as the
principle actors in international law, interact in an environment of anarchy, which
focuses on war and peace and embraces security as the overriding goal).
42. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 1-3 (examining the provisions within arms
control treaties that govern the terms of producing and sharing information).
43. See id. at 3 ("[P]roblems of information have been at the heart of arms
control policy since the beginning.").
44. See id. at 4 (defining verification as a procedure whereby parties rely on
their own efforts and resources to acquire necessary information).
45. See id. (defining assurances as a method whereby a party provides another
with information through the providing party's own efforts and resources).
Assurances may include certifications or physical evidence. Id.
46. See id. (suggesting that verification methods can encompass a variety of
techniques, ranging from public research to espionage).
47. See Roland J. Stanger, Espionage and Arms Control, in ESSAYS ON
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 83, 99 ("[E]spionage is
simply covert, unauthorized inspection.").
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scheduled within the framework of the cooperative agreement.48
Additionally, the parties need not explicitly recognize many
verification techniques in security agreements because they are
already legitimate without specific authorization. 9 For example, the
first modem arms control agreement between the United States and
Russia relied exclusively on external verification techniques.5 0 The
United States depended upon ground-based seismological monitoring
stations outside Soviet territory, as well as aircraft outside the Soviet
Union, in order to verify compliance.5"
However, positive international law does not recognize espionage,
therefore triggering unique international legal issues. The practices
of spying and eavesdropping should therefore be separated from
verification measures and examined in isolation to determine their
impact on international relations.
III. ESPIONAGE - A FUNCTIONAL TOOL FOR
SECURITY COOPERATION
The ability of verification and assurance measures to reveal the
extent to which parties comply with treaty obligations is limited.
Monitoring activities are frequently scheduled and occur in
accordance with mutually-agreeable guidelines. As an example, the
"Verification Protocol" of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty ("CTBT") establishes a procedure that enables states to
request an on-site inspection of another treaty member's facilities. 2
48. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 28-29 (summarizing the rationales for
establishing explicit verification and assurance regimes).
49. See id. at 4 (stating that states may use many verification techniques
"unilaterally, without any explicit agreements").
50. See id. at 32 (noting that the Limited Test Ban Treaty was concluded
despite the "fear of offensive defection and the lack of trust" that epitomized the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States).
51. See id. at 33-34 (adding that in 1963, the United States deployed two
specialized surveillance satellites).
52. See Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear
Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 405, 448-49 (2003) (noting that the CTBT establishes a
"global verification regime" which relies on a number of techniques to ensure
compliance); see also Abbott, supra note 10, at 28-29 (citing several rationales for
"why states sometimes find it necessary or desirable to spell out explicit
1102 [19:1091
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Thus, states can prepare in advance of an inspection, and potentially
create an inaccurate and misleading veneer of compliance. 3
Similarly, the conventional information-yielding regimes
characteristic to some international security arrangements may
supply only a limited amount of data necessary to maximize global
order. For instance, India successfully camouflaged preparations for
a 1999 nuclear test because it knew the schedule of satellite orbits in
the vicinity of the testing facility." Even when national technical
means are more difficult to defeat, such methods cannot look inside
closed buildings, provide insight into the decisions of foreign policy
councils, or reveal the foreign policy intentions of state leaders. 5
Taken together, conventional verification and assurance
techniques represent an incomplete method for yielding information
sufficient to satisfy states that parties to an agreement are complying
with their international obligations. Because of these limitations, it is
unlikely that states would ever risk the consequences of foreign
"defection" from international security agreements unless they
retained the ability to covertly monitor their neighbors' behavior.56
arrangements for the production of information ex ante, in their agreements").
53. See, e.g., John J. Fialka, White House Claims of Soviet Test Ban Cheating
Are Challenged by New Bomb Detection System, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1986
(highlighting the reality of the challenges that verification poses), 1986 WL-WSJ
279650; Jack Anderson, Arms-Treaty Compliance Hard to Verify, WASH. POST,
Sep. 28, 1984, at E7 (illustrating the difficulty of confirming suspected violations
of arms control treaties), 1984 WL 2014063. But see Stanger, supra note 47, at 91
(suggesting that the Russian government openly scuttled the test ban treaty and
resumed testing nuclear weapons because "they did not believe they could test
effectively without detection").
54. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 22 (explaining that, as technological
advancements give rise to increasingly sophisticated espionage methods, target
countries become more apt at evading detection).
55. See id. at 25 (commenting that, despite technological advances, "the need
for reliable agents is continual"); see also Stanger, supra note 47, at 92 ("[I]t is
precisely in providing reliable information regarding intention that inspection is
least satisfactory."). Further highlighting the practical impacts of these limitations,
the author argues that "[p]hysical inspection.., would not reveal whether there
was any intention to launch." Id.
56. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 16 (defining "defection" as a party's
offensive or defensive motivation to abandon its treaty obligations). A party is
encouraged to offensively defect when cheating on the other unknowing treaty
members will yield a more profitable outcome. Id. at 16-17. A party defensively
defects to protect against the losses that it perceives will result when another party
2004] 1103
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In addition to general doubt regarding the effectiveness of physical
inspection regimes in monitoring international compliance, a state's
assurances are similarly subject to manipulation.57 Assurances
represent a monitoring technique in which state parties to an
agreement are required to provide other parties with information that
demonstrates the assuring party's compliant behavior. 8 Therefore,
prior to cooperating, states must balance the likelihood that
verification regimes will achieve the desired threshold of information
against the risks that a party will evade a treaty and escape
detection.59
Given the potentially-unreliable mechanics of measuring
compliance, it is hardly conceivable that states would otherwise
functionally cooperate pursuant to their national security interests.
60
However, with the availability of espionage, states are more willing
to enter into potentially-risky cooperatives. When armed with such
tools as spying and eavesdropping, states enjoy greater certainty that
they will be able to validate international compliance, or at least
detect when other participants are failing to comply with the treaty.6'
Espionage also serves to increase trust between parties where
international security-related agreements that rely on affirmative
terminates its obligations. Id. at 20-21.
57. See Stanger, supra note 47, at 97 (finding that doubt as to the effectiveness
of physical inspection has led to the pursuit of inspection alternatives, such as the
use of lie detectors); Abbott, supra note 10, at 41-42 (describing assurance
mechanisms, such as data exchange and notification provisions, that parties to
arms control agreements have employed).
58. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 23-24 (providing examples of assurances,
including promulgated legal restrictions; visible enforcement activities; and
records and documents that describe inventories, inspection results, and other
relevant data).
59. See Stanger, supra note 47, at 90-91 (commenting that the decision to
implement a test ban, as an arms control arrangement, is a choice between two
risks: the risk of nuclear proliferation if there is no test ban treaty and the risk that
the other side will try to evade the treaty if one exists).
60. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 24 (stating that the strategy of assurance gives
each individual party the power to control the process of assembling and
conveying its own information about its defense capabilities).
61. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 25 (commenting on the diverse goals that
are advanced through spying and espionage, ranging from detecting violators of
U.N. sanctions to waging war against international drug trafficking).
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assurances of compliance are concerned. Without espionage,
countries could be required simply to accept the information
provided by other treaty partners as accurate. Mutual trust between
treaty parties increases when espionage affirms that the assurances
provided are accurate.62 States will be more willing to cooperate with
other states in the future if their espionage confirms that the
assurances provided by these parties are truthful.63
A. ESPIONAGE FACILITATES COOPERATIVE NEGOTIATIONS
Functionalism predicts that overlapping layers of cooperation
yield improved international security when distinct communities
work to achieve consensus on matters of mutual interest. 64 Espionage
facilitates this cooperation at the "common activity" level by
enabling states to better understand their neighbors' security needs
and concerns.65
Spying and eavesdropping provide information that permits state
leaders to better appreciate their partners' negotiating positions, and
thereby encourages the facilitation of strategic dialogue. Initially,
uncertainties regarding a negotiating partner's preferences,
intentions, and capabilities may either prevent the formation of a
cooperative forum, or may adversely affect the substantive
negotiations once the parties agree to cooperate.66 Also, a state leader
62. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 26 ("[S]tates seeking to convey assurances
may find some foreign monitoring desirable as a way to channel
information....").
63. See Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International
Law, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 93, 119 (2003) (framing international law as an
"interactive game," whereby prospective treaty partners who are "repeat players"
are likely to accumulate increasing amounts of their partners' trust over time).
64. See Long, supra note 37, at 120, 132 (establishing that security, from a
functionalist perspective, results from an integrative and community-oriented
approach).
65. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 29 (stating that assurance procedures enhance
interactive communications between parties entering into an agreement and allow
the parties to communicate their concerns).
66. See Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International
Law, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 679, 692-95 (2003) (noting that states entering into an
international agreement will typically view the prospective compliance of other
states with skepticism).
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may be hesitant to bargain with a negotiating partner whom he
suspects of misrepresenting other strategic issues that bear on treaty
compliance.67 Accordingly, espionage can yield information about a
foreign state that encourages an otherwise hesitant party to
negotiate.68 In this sense, espionage creates a cooperative opportunity
for parties with similar functional interests to negotiate mutually-
beneficial outcomes.69
Espionage also provides a pool of information that a state could
potentially share with its allies.70 This type of intelligence pooling is
codified as one of the "interdiction principles" of the recently-
conceived Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), which represents
the commitment of eleven member states to countering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.71 In pledging to
exchange intelligence gathered by their individual intelligence
agencies,72 PSI members have already demonstrated the effectiveness
67. See id at 694-95 (commenting that the perceived risk of non-compliance
by one state may affect its treaty negotiations with another). "On one hand,
opportunistic States may attempt to push the level of commitments higher (than
would be the case in the absence of the compliance dilemma) .... On the other
hand, non-opportunistic States may push the level of commitments lower to
counteract such pressures." Id.
68. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 28-29 (highlighting that states may be more
confident and willing to enter into an agreement once they are certain that the
current participating states have adequate assurance procedures in place ).
69. See id. at 27 (providing that assurances further states' goals of "promoting
cooperation and keeping the agreement intact").
70. See id. at 18 (suggesting that where international compliance with treaties
must be assured through observation, states may benefit from large, multilateral
agreements that can reduce the costs of observation through the pooling of
information between states).
71. See U.S. Department of State, White House Fact Sheet (Sept. 4, 2003)
(noting that one of the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI") "interdiction
principles" is to provide for "the rapid exchange of relevant information" while
"protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other
states . . ."), at http://www.state.gov/t/ np/rls/fs/23764.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2004). See generally U.S. Department of State, White House Press Release (Sept.
4, 2003) (providing background information concerning the PSI),
http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/prsrl/23809.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
72. See Rebecca Weiner, Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of
WMD Materiel, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (June 16, 2003) (commenting
that PSI members have pledged to share intelligence on arms trafficking),
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030716.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2004); see also
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of intelligence collaboration in accomplishing the mutual goal of
counter-proliferation.73 Such collaboration facilitates international
cooperation at the functional level on two planes. First, distributing
intelligence gained through espionage solidifies the commitments
that allies make to one another.74 Espionage is a dangerous endeavor,
and by shouldering the burden of the consequences that may accrue
from committing espionage, nations that share the fruits of their
espionage activities reaffirm to their allies that they are committed to
the peaceful achievement of mutually-stated goals.75
Second, espionage helps other states make difficult political
decisions by better informing their decision makers with necessary
data.76 Espionage permits parties to complement positive law
verification and assurance measures with other relevant information
that facilitates functional cooperation. During negotiations, critical
Interview by the Arms Control Association with John Bolton, The New
Proliferation Security Initiative (Nov. 4, 2003) (noting that the intelligence
services of the eleven PSI member nations have consulted on "how to arrange the
expeditious sharing of information when it is appropriate to support an interdiction
operation..."), http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/November/Bolton.asp
(last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
73. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Insider Tells of Nuclear Deals, Cash; Pakistani
Scientist Netted $3 Million, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at Al (noting that, in
October 2003, Italy seized a shipment of nuclear weapons components en route to
Libya after receiving intelligence from PSI members Britain and the United
States); see also GlobalSecurity.org, Proliferation Security Initiative (noting that,
in August 2003, Taiwan detained a North Korean ship carrying chemicals that can
be used to make rocket fuel based on intelligence provided by the United States),
at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
74. See Keith B. Richburg, A Close European Ally Hopes to Fortify U.S.
Partnership, WASH. POST, May 1, 2002, at A18 (conveying that, after the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Spanish Prime Minister Jose
Maria Aznar met with President Bush to discuss new intelligence-sharing
arrangements as part of an effort to strengthen the United States' and Europe's
strategic relationship), 2002 WL 19157559.
75. See id. (providing that Aznar and Bush shared mutual perspectives on
terrorism, similar interests in Latin America, and a common desire to promote
membership growth in NATO).
76. See Wassenaar Arrangement and the Future of Multilateral Export
Controls: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 39
(2000) (statement of Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) (stating that in 1990, France provided
the United States with information about Iran's weapons program, yielding "a
better intelligence brief than [the United States] could give them").
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information regarding a party's preferences is typically difficult to
acquire through conventional sources.77  The challenge of
appreciating a negotiating partner's preferences is compounded by
the fact that a state's desired outcomes may shift due to changing
geopolitical circumstances." Therefore, espionage is especially
useful for developing this type of information because the sources
and methods that spies employ are tailored to account for real-time
information adjustments.7 9
B. ESPIONAGE FACILITATES COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE
In contrast to their realist counterparts, functionalists discount the
notion that international cooperation derives from rules that become
valid only through threat of sanction.80 Instead, functionalists predict
that states view peace as a "superordinate goal," and will cooperate
with other states to achieve peace regardless of the prospective
imposition of punitive sanctions.81 In this sense, espionage buttresses
the functional approach to international cooperation. Espionage may
be thought of as a tool that enables "super-validation" of
international compliance with security agreements. With espionage
available as a means by which to ensure parties are upholding their
77. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 14 (commenting that it is difficult to obtain
information about states' preferences since such information is often "secret, self-
serving, or distorted"). "In a complex collective entity like a state, full sets of
cardinal or interval preferences may never be clearly defined." Id.
78. See id. at 15 (stating that strategic situations may change because of factors
such as popular perception, technological advances, and changes in government).
79. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 22, 24 (detailing the results of the
Congressionally-appointed Aspin-Brown Commission, created in 1995, which
investigated the value of clandestine intelligence-gathering in relation to other,
more conventional techniques). The Commission concluded that the CIA offered
the best "up-to-date information," as well as "better insights into the evolving
humanitarian crisis in Burundi" and "the attitudes of leaders in surrounding
nations" than the other techniques the Commission studied. Id.
80. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International
Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260, 276 (1940) (stating that a rule of international law is
invalid when the violation of such rule does not result in a sanction).
81. See A.J.R. Groom, Functionalism and World Society, in FUNCTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 93, 98
(explaining that functionalism predicts that states will move beyond their conflicts
to achieve peace).
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end of a security bargain, nations are more likely to cooperate within
functional areas to achieve peace.82
Even after negotiations for a security agreement yield mutually-
agreeable terms, circumstances may prevent national leaders from
soliciting the required domestic support necessary to adopt the treaty.
Realist "defenders of sovereign prerogatives" may not be willing to
commit a country to the obligation to give credible assurances, and
thus, political circumstances may preclude national leaders from
brokering an international security agreement. 3 To gain consensus,
nations may be forced to negotiate a watered-down monitoring
regime that appeases domestic leaders and assures them that the state
is not surrendering its sovereign integrity. 4
Parties to an international security agreement are unlikely to
cooperate absent a rigorous verification and assurance regime."
However, if domestic constraints only permit state parties to enter
into agreements that are backed by weak verification measures,
nations may nevertheless cooperate if espionage is available to
complement the insufficient compliance regime. Therefore,
functional cooperation results from freeing states of the political
costs that national leaders may suffer if they opt into an overly
stringent verification regime. Instead, the availability of espionage
allows for substantive verification to occur "under the radar.
' '8 6
In sum, the advantages that espionage offers over legally-binding
verification and assurance regimes tip the scales in favor of
82. See Abbott, supra note 10, at 29 (noting that assurance procedures can
address noncompliance concerns and serve as a check on states suspected of
violating an agreement).
83. See id. (noting that governments can more easily obtain political and
bureaucratic cooperation with other states when general and specific assurances are
presented).
84. See id. at 28-29 (explaining that states may prefer more general assurance
commitments, or may seek to place limits on the monitoring activities they consent
to in order to gamer support for the agreement while preventing other states from
accessing highly-sensitive information).
85. Cf Hewitson, supra note 52, at 488 & n.452 (suggesting that, while
unilateralist behavior undercuts international cooperation, strengthened treaties and
verification regimes improve the prospects for achieving cooperation).
86. See Demarest, supra note 9, at 330 ("[C]overt action is not espionage, but
some espionage activities may constitute covert action.").
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functional cooperation. Absent a sufficiently stringent monitoring
regime, antagonistic parties may not cooperate, especially in the
strategic context of global security. 7 However, espionage enables
nations to cooperate functionally, secure in the knowledge that they
will be able to counter noncompliance.88
Where verification and assurance measures may not illuminate
noncompliance with a treaty until it is too late to remedy the
derogation, espionage allows for real-time detection of violators.89
Evidence of noncompliance gained through espionage can preempt
crisis situations before tensions escalate beyond a point at which a
cooperative solution is still possible.90 For example, North Korea
revealed its secret nuclear weapons program in October 2002, eight
years after an agreed framework effectively committed the
communist state to freezing any progress made toward developing
nuclear weapons.9" North Korea's abrupt announcement amounted to
a confession that it intentionally deceived the international
community regarding its nuclear ambitions. This revelation
precipitated an international crisis for the United States, as well as its
strategic partners in the far East.92
The nature of the revelation virtually eliminated any possibility of
resolving the underlying disputes diplomatically, as states had been
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (commenting on barriers to
cooperation).
88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (asserting that espionage serves
as a tool that enables states to achieve peace).
89. See Stone, supra note 14, at 36-37 (pointing out that historical conceptions
of espionage developed before the evolution of instantaneous radio
communications and satellites); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 22 (noting that
methods of espionage have evolved from radio transmissions to satellite
surveillance).
90. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 25-26 (establishing how espionage may
function as an "early-warning system" and serve as a check on the misbehavior of
other states).
91. See generally Phillip Saunders, Confronting Ambiguity: How to Handle
North Korea's Nuclear Program, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1, 2003, at 11
(providing background on North Korea's announcement and subsequent
withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty), 2003 WL 16228468.
92. See id. (elaborating on the differing assessments of North Korea's
objectives and commenting that the inability to decipher North Korea's true
intentions has caused rifts between the United States and its allies).
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misled to believe that North Korea's nuclear program was
exclusively aimed at peaceful uses.93 Effective espionage may have
revealed North Korea's nuclear violations years before its program
became entrenched. As a result, North Korea could have been
confronted with evidence of its transgressions, thereby maximizing
the potential for an agreeable resolution.
CONCLUSION
The global security environment that has evolved since the fall of
the Soviet Union has precipitated a wide range of volatile
international hazards. New threats have replaced the relatively
predictable strategic stand-off characteristic of the preexisting
bipolar confrontation between the United States and its communist
foe.94 Terrorism, weapons proliferation, management of scarce
resources and environmental conservation, ethnic and religious
conflict, and illegal immigration dominate state foreign policy
agendas.95 Indeed, the international terrain is ripe for continued
reliance on espionage as a means by which to develop information
about neighboring states.96
The utility of espionage will gain momentum as a recognized
technique of self-defense as these strategic hazards increasingly
threaten isolated regions previously thought immune from global
conflict.97 Espionage is a readily-pursuable avenue by which state
leaders may obtain intelligence, especially in lesser-developed
countries that may find sophisticated national technical means to be
93. See Jonathan D. Pollack, The United States, North Korea, and the End of
the Agreed Framework, 56 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 11, 42 (2003) (noting the
likelihood that the United States was "caught flat-footed by the speed and
decisiveness with which Pyongyang had reactivated its long-dormant plutonium
program").
94. See id. at 26 (referencing threats from North Korea and other hostile
nations, as well as from fellow democracies).
95. See Demarest, supra note 9, at 342 (listing numerous threats to
international peace and security).
96. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 26 (concluding that espionage remains a
necessary tool for monitoring the international misbehavior of unpredictable
states).
97. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (describing the practice of
espionage as the exercise of a state's right to self-defense).
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economically infeasible.9" Namibia, for instance, organized its first
central intelligence service only seven years ago, citing terrorism,
ethnic conflict, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and diamonds as
threats requiring the conduct of espionage. 99
International verification and assurance regimes provide a
valuable framework for understanding interactions between states.'00
Prospective treaty partners must satisfy strategic informational
demands prior to entering negotiations, during negotiations, and
throughout performance of the brokered agreement. The twin
strategies of verification and assurance capture these critical
information requirements.
As this essay suggests, states should not consider espionage
merely one of the many "arrows" in the verification "quiver."
Instead, the international community should examine espionage in
isolation to measure, accurately and completely, its contribution to
cooperative dialogue. 10 1 In the international security context,
espionage is not treated as other positively-recognized and structured
monitoring strategies. 02 The legal status of espionage is also less
developed than conventional, legally-binding monitoring
agreements.
This essay has proposed that espionage is most appropriately
considered to be a tool that enables functional cooperation. 03 In
adopting a functional approach, this essay has demonstrated that
espionage encourages and enables international security agreements
that parties would otherwise be hesitant to broker. At the functional
level of international security activities, espionage therefore enables
98. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 18 (noting that lesser-developed nations also
partake in the transnational intelligence game).
99. See id. (highlighting Namibia as an example of a lesser-developed nation
that has practiced espionage).
100. See supra Part III.A (illustrating how espionage facilitates negotiations
towards international agreements).
101. See supra Part II.B (concluding that espionage triggers unique international
legal issues and should be viewed in isolation from verification measures).
102. See generally supra Part II.B (elaborating on the functional approach to
international security).
103. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing how espionage facilitates
cooperative negotiations).
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cooperation. International security arrangements are unique in terms
of the potential consequences of defection. It is therefore unlikely
that states will negotiate security agreements unless they are
permitted to employ all available means to monitor compliance. The
availability of spying and eavesdropping encourages states to
negotiate frameworks that are domestically-acceptable.
So enabled, a heightened level of international cooperation is
achieved, ultimately yielding increasingly frequent iterations of state-
to-state transactions. As a result of this cooperation, espionage
ultimately contributes to greater possibilities for facilitating inter-
activity dialogue.
